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As social animals, we regularly act in the interest of others by making decisions on their
behalf. These decisions can take the form of choices between smaller short-term rewards
and larger long-term rewards, and can be effectively indexed by temporal discounting
(TD). In a TD paradigm, a reward loses subjective value with increasing delay presumably
because it becomes more difficult to simulate how much the recipient (e.g., future self)
will value it. If this is the case, then the value of delayed rewards should be discounted
even more steeply when we are choosing for someone whose feelings we do not
readily simulate, such as socially distant strangers. Second, the ability to simulate shows
individual differences and is indexed by trait empathy. We hypothesized that individuals
high in trait empathy will more readily simulate, and hence discount less steeply for
distant others, compared to those who are low on trait empathy. To test these predictions,
we asked 63 participants from the general population to perform a TD task from the
perspectives of close and distant others, as well as their own. People were found to
discount less steeply for themselves, and the steepness of TD increased with increasing
distance from self. Additionally, individuals who scored high in trait empathy were found to
discount less steeply for distant others compared to those who scored low. These findings
confirm the role of empathy in determining how we choose rewards for others.
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INTRODUCTION
As social beings, we do not just make decisions for ourselves,
but regularly have to make decisions on behalf of others. We
invest great effort into judging what someone else would like
when buying gifts, or making plans for them. Consider the case
of a husband trying to decide what his wife would prefer: a
fancy dinner out this evening or a weekend trip away in 2 weeks’
time. How do we make such decisions? A body of literature on
how we make choices for ourselves shows that a key role in
these decisions is played by our emotional state (Damasio et al.,
1991). If our own emotions are crucial to making choices for
ourselves, it follows that we need a good understanding of another
person’s emotions and mental states in order to make choices
on their behalf. Empathy is a trait that quantifies this capacity
to understand others’ emotions and mental states and respond
appropriately to them (for a review, see Chakrabarti et al., 2006).
In the current paper, we examine the role of empathy in making
choices on another’s behalf in an intertemporal context.
One of the most commonly encountered choices are those
between short-term and long-term rewards. Such intertemporal
preferences are indexed by temporal discounting (TD). In
a typical TD paradigm, a series of choices between smaller
immediate and larger delayed monetary amounts are presented.
The commonly observed response pattern is that with increasing
delay, the more immediate though lesser rewards are preferred
over larger, later rewards. The rate at which rewards are
subjectively devalued slows down as delay increases, resulting
in a steep-to-flat “discounting curve,” suggesting that rewards
are devalued with time more rapidly over shorter delays than
longer delays (Ainslie, 1975). This discounting function has been
associated with intelligence (Mischel and Metzner, 1962; Kirby
et al., 2005; Shamosh et al., 2008), impulsivity (Bickel et al., 1999;
de Wit et al., 2007; Christakou et al., 2011), and consequential
life outcomes such as health, wealth and social-functioning
(Mischel et al., 1989; Moffitt et al., 2011). While predictors of
how individuals discount when they have to make choices about
themselves have been well investigated, little research has focused
on the discounting functions for others.
It has been suggested that we devalue delayed rewards because
we empathise less with the feelings of their recipient (i.e., future
selves) (Loewenstein, 1996). A key process underlying empathy
is that of simulation, i.e., the ability to put ourselves in the
shoes of others (Gordon, 1992; Shanton and Goldman, 2010).
Simulation provides a potential mechanism to understand how
another person feels by imagining how we ourselves would feel in
their situation, and has been proposed to underlie theory of mind
(Shanton and Goldman, 2010). This mechanism applies equally
to ourselves, i.e., we put ourselves in the shoes of our future
selves, to predict how we will feel in the future. Recent functional
neuroimaging studies provide indirect evidence for simulation,
by showing involvement of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
in making value-based decisions for self as well as for others
(Nicolle et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2012; Janowski et al., 2013).
Neural and other indices of simulation (e.g., vicarious pain
responses) are greater if the person is a socially close one
(i.e., familiar or liked) than if the person is socially distant
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 174 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
O’Connell et al Empathy and reward choices for others
(Singer et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2010). Arguably,
simulation is easiest if the person to simulate is one’s own self
(minimum social distance). Social distance could thus be viewed
as a proxy measure for ease of simulation.
The above effect has direct implications for TD for self and
others. For the self, it suggests that increasing the delay to
reward reduces empathy for the recipient by increasing their social
distance. This was supported by a set of studies by Bartels and
Rips (2010) showing that social distance (operationalized by the
authors as “psychological connectedness”) with the future self
was directly proportional to the rate of discounting. For the
other, it predicts that people will tend to discount less steeply
for themselves and close others (who are easy to simulate),
compared to distant others (who are difficult to simulate)
(see Figure 1).
The ability to put one’s self in another’s place and simulate
their feelings is indexed by trait empathy. If TD changes as
a function of simulation, it is expected that highly empathic
people (who simulate easily) will discount less steeply when
making choices on behalf of others. As a corollary, people
low in empathy will find it difficult to simulate distant others,
and hence will discount more steeply when making choices
on their behalf. To test these predictions, we examined TD
from the perspective of others at different social distances.
It is important to note that this is not equivalent to social
discounting, in which rewards for others are discounted between
close and distant others with no delay (Jones and Rachlin,
2006).
Specifically, we predicted that:
(1) TD for others will be steeper than for self and will increase
with increasing social distance (i.e., the relative steepness of
discounting will vary as follows: distant other > close other
> self).
(2) Trait empathy will be associated negatively with the steepness
of discounting for distant others (i.e., highly empathic people
will discount less steeply for distant others).
FIGURE 1 | Diagram of the hypothesized effect of the social distance of
others on the temporal discounting of rewards for them.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
76 participants (38 female; age: M = 24.7 years, SD = 1.52),
drawn largely from the university student population, consented
to participate and received £6 for their time. An exclusion
criterion was being a non-native English speaker. This study
was approved by the University of Reading Research Ethics
Committee.
TRAIT EMPATHY MEASURES
Participants completed online versions of the Empathy
Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004) and
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). The
personal distress subscale of the IRI was omitted as it was not
directly relevant to this study.
SOCIAL DISTANCE PROCEDURE
A social distance procedure was used to identify close and
distant others. This task measures perceptions of others across
dimensions of familiarity, similarity and kinship (Liviatan et al.,
2008; Osin´ski, 2009). Participants were first instructed to list
persons they know in descending order of familiarity between 1
and 100 at selected positions [as described in (Jones and Rachlin,
2006)]. Persons identified at the 4th and 43rd positions were used
as close and distant others respectively, based on the observation
that these points covered the maximum rate of change of the
social discounting curve in a previous report (Jones and Rachlin,
2006). There were no restrictions on the category of relationship
that could be used for these positions (e.g., spouse, sibling,
friend), nor was this data collected.
TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING TASK
For this task, the following instructions were given by the
experimenter:
“This task involves a series of choices between smaller amounts
of money now or larger amounts of money later. However, you
will also be asked to perform the task as if you were someone you
know. Try and put yourself in their shoes and imagine how they
would respond.”
Participants were told to try and not to factor in particulars
about their or the others’ financial situation, only to select the
preferred option. Because of the current study’s focus on empathy,
participants were instructed to make the decision from the
perspective of the other, rather than for the benefit of other, which
is more akin to altruism. To avoid self-bias (i.e., participants
resorting to responding with their own preferences without
considering how others might differ), decisions for self-took place
after decisions for others had been completed, as suggested by
Faro and Rottenstreich (2006).
The order of blocks (one each) for close and distant conditions
was counterbalanced across participants. The task was run using
E-Prime version 2.0. The person’s perspective from whom the
task was to be performed was shown before every trial and
under the options during selection. Task options were between
a variable immediate amount (< £100) or £100 at one of a
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randomly ordered sequence of 6 delays (weeks: 1, 3; months: 2,
5, 9, 18). Both immediate and delayed amounts were presented
together and the participant selected the left or right amount with
a keystroke (see Figure 2). The sides on which the immediate
and delayed rewards were presented were counterbalanced across
participants. The double-limits algorithm was used to estimate
the variable amount (Johnson and Bickel, 2002) and indifference
points (i.e., immediate amount value at which choices of £100 at
a given delay were equally likely) used to map TD curves. Rate of
TD was estimated using the area-under-the-curve (AuC) of the
plot of indifference points against time (i.e., the higher the AuC,
the lower the steepness/rate of discounting) (Myerson et al., 2001).
To reduce floor/ceiling effects, participants who discounted less
than 5% or more than 95% after a delay of 5 months in more
than one condition were removed.
RESULTS
After screening participants for the exclusion criteria (8 due to
TD criteria, 5 due to non-native speaker criteria), 63 participants
(34 females, 29 males; age:M = 23.8 years, SD = 1.38) remained.
Due to the direction of predicted effects, results of planned
post-hoc comparisons are reported at the 1-tailed level. IRI ques-
tionnaire data were lost for two participants due to a technical
fault.
To test that individuals exhibited TD, a one-way repeated
measures ANOVA was performed with delay as a within-subjects
factor and indifference points in the self-condition as a dependent
variable. A significant effect of delay was observed, F(5, 310) =
180.56, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.477.
To test the effect of social distance on TD, a one-way
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with social condition
(self/close/distant other) as a within-subjects factor and rate
of TD as a dependent variable. A significant effect of social
distance was observed, F(2, 124) = 5.12, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.076.
Planned contrasts (Bonferroni corrected) showed a significant
difference between self (M = 958, SD = 58.92) and distant
other (M = 731, SD = 62.39), t(62) = 3.07, p = 0.003, d =
0.39. A marginally significant difference was seen for TD
between self and close other (M = 850, SE = 62.18), t(62) =
FIGURE 2 | Task design and an example trial from each social condition
block (note: delay, immediate amount and sides on which amounts
are presented vary within blocks).
1.91, p = 0.06, d = 0.24, but not significant between TD
for close and distant others [t(62) = 1.48, p = 0.143, d =
0.24] (Figure 3). Pearson’s correlations were performed to
examine the association between the steepness of discounting
and trait empathy in specific task conditions (see Table 1).
Specifically, TD for distant others was negatively associated with
empathy scores (i.e., individuals high in empathy discounted
less steeply for distant others, rEQ-distant(61) = 0.220, p = 0.042,
rIRI-distant(59) = 0.310, p = 0.008). No association was found
for self [rEQ-self(61) = 0.027, p = 0.416, rIRI-self(59) = 0.050, p =
0.352], or close conditions [rEQ-close(61) = 0.162, p = 0.103,
rIRI-close(59) = 0.134, p = 0.152].
DISCUSSION
Making decisions on behalf of others is a common part of
everyday life, and yet how we make these choices remains largely
unknown. In this experiment, we tested the hypothesis that
this process is influenced by social distance and trait empathy.
Choice behavior was operationalized using a TD paradigm,
where participants were asked to choose between a series of
immediate and distant rewards on behalf of close and distant
others, as well as themselves. We found that (1) people discount
less steeply for themselves compared to others, and that the
steepness of discounting for others increases with social distance,
FIGURE 3 | Temporal discounting curves for social conditions.
Error-bars at 95% CI and adjusted for within-subjects variance (significantly
different at: ∗0.05 level; ∗∗0.01 level).
Table 1 | Correlations between temporal discounting in each social
condition and trait empathy measures (significantly correlated at the:
∗0.05 level; ∗∗0.01 level).
Self Close Distant
EQ R 0.027 0.162 0.220∗
Sig. 0.416 0.103 0.042
IRI R 0.05 0.134 0.310∗∗
Sig. 0.352 0.152 0.009
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(2) compared to people who score low on trait empathy, highly
empathic people discount less steeply for distant others.
TD was steeper as the social distance of reward recipients
increased across conditions of self, close and distant others.
Participants were explicitly instructed to simulate the reward
recipients in the task (i.e., “put yourself in the shoes of the
recipient”). The ease of simulation varies as a function of social
distance, i.e., simulation is easiest when one is making choices
about oneself, and participants were found to discount least
steeply in this condition. People who are similar to one’s self, or
who are socially close, are easier to simulate compared to socially
distant others. Consistent with this, rewards for self-similar
persons are found to be higher in subjective value and show
higher activation of reward-related brain areas, when compared
to those for self-dissimilar persons (Mobbs et al., 2009). Finally,
simulation is most difficult when making choices on behalf
of a distant other. As expected, discounting for distant others
produced the steepest slope. These parallel findings show that
people tend to choose more immediate compared to delayed
rewards as psychological connectedness with the reward recipient
reduces (Bartels and Rips, 2010).
In this experiment, participants always performed TD for
self-last to avoid reported self-bias effects (i.e., the increased
tendency to use one’s own preferences as a default in choosing
for others after having made the same choices for self). It is
possible that such biasing effects may work both ways, such
that choices for oneself made after choices for others are biased
toward others’ predicted preferences. However, our results are
concordant with those observed by Beisswanger et al. (2003), who
used a between-group design to avoid order effects, and reported
that choices for others were more impulsive compared to choices
for self. Given that impulsive choices are associated with steeper
TD (Alessi and Petry, 2003), this supports the present finding that
intertemporal choices are more impulsive for others than for self.
Our results contrast with a recent report by Ziegler and Tunney
(2012), which shows that choices for others in a TD paradigm
become less impulsive as social distance increases. Critically,
participants in their task were instructed to select the option that
another should select. This frames the choice in a way that biases
participants toward self-control (i.e., choosing the reward that is
best for the recipient, which may not be the reward the recipient
would choose on his/her own). This key difference in the frame
of operation for the TD task can potentially explain the divergent
results.
Simulation is a key empathic mechanism for internally
representing the emotions and motivations of others (Keysers
and Gazzola, 2007). Accordingly, we expected that the individuals
who are high in trait empathy would be able to simulate
distant others more easily, and hence discount less steeply when
making choices on their behalf. This hypothesis was supported as
trait empathy (using two separate trait measures) was inversely
related to the steepness of TD for distant others. This finding
replicates a previous report showing that people who score
higher in trait empathy make more self-similar choices for
others (Faro and Rottenstreich, 2006). Additionally, the results
suggest a role for empathy in making intertemporal choices,
which was elegantly predicted by Loewenstein almost two decades
ago (Loewenstein, 1996). This result is also consistent with
previous work that suggests a link between TD and other
social behaviors. The steepness of TD is negatively correlated
with altruistic tendencies (Harris and Madden, 2002; Yi et al.,
2005). Steeper TD has also been reported in persons with
social anxiety (Rounds et al., 2007), a trait marked by the
reduced motivation to affiliate with others (Mallott et al.,
2009).
In our study, no significant association was observed between
TD for self/close other and trait empathy. This would be expected
if the value of delayed rewards for recipients is indexed by
individual differences in how easily we can simulate them. This
null finding replicates a previous report in which a positive
association between trait empathy and less-impulsive choices
was noted for others, but not for self (Faro and Rottenstreich,
2006). We speculate that there are two possible reasons why
this null finding was observed. First, both trait measures
of empathy (IRI and EQ) ask questions about hypothetical
unknown/distant others, which increases the sensitivity of these
measures over larger social distances. Secondly, the self and
close other conditions might be susceptible to ceiling effects
in simulation; effects that compress individual differences and
make their association with trait empathy difficult to observe.
A possible method to overcome this limitation could be to use
longer delays in the TD task, reducing the ease of simulation
for future selves as done by Bartels and Rips (2010). A caveat
of the current study is that the observed relationship between
empathy and TD for others may not generalize to the entire
lifespan, since the age range of the current study is fairly narrow.
Future research should examine this relationship in other age
groups, particularly adolescence, when immature discounting
is observed (Christakou et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2011). A
second direction for future work is to test the hypothesized
role of simulation in intertemporal choices for others using
objective indices of simulation measured by psychophysiological
and neuroimaging techniques. Current experiments in our lab are
testing this.
In this experiment, we show how social distance influences
choice of future rewards for self and others, by showing that
people discount least steeply for themselves, and most steeply
for distant others. We interpret this using a simulation based
account of empathy that suggests that socially distant people
are most difficult to simulate. Crucially, we find that trait
empathy influences how we choose rewards for others; highly
empathic people discount less steeply for distant others. Future
research should examine these processes in psychopathological
populations with deficits in both reward and empathy processes,
such as people with addiction (Gizewski et al., 2012), attention
disorders (Marton et al., 2008) and those diagnosed with Autism
Spectrum Conditions (Schmitz et al., 2008; Dichter et al., 2010;
Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010).
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